Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Camille Castillo Johnson v. Travis Paul Johnson :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Samuel M. Barker; Bradley J. Schofiled; Jeffrey A. Callister; Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford;
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant.
Glen M. Richman; Barbara W. Richman; Richman & Richman; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Johnson v. Johnson, No. 20061003 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6942

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CAMILLE CASTILLO JOHNSON,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

District Court No. 044907342
Appellate No. 20061003-CA

TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON,
Respondent/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DECREE OF
DIVORCE, AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
OF THE UTAH THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING

Glen M. Richman, Esq.
Barbara W. Richman, Esq.
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Samuel M. Barker, #6073
Bradley J. Schofield, #7986
Jeffrey A. Callister, #9962
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD

A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite200
Murray, Utah 84107

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUN 19 2007

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CAMILLE CASTILLO JOHNSON,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

District Court No. 044907342
Appellate No. 20061003-CA

TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON,
Respondent/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DECREE OF
DIVORCE, AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
OF THE UTAH THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING

Glen M. Richman, Esq.
Barbara W. Richman, Esq.
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Samuel M. Barker, #6073
Bradley J. Schofield, #7986
Jeffrey A. Callister, #9962
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite200
Murray, Utah 84107

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER REGARDING
RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANCE ABUSE SHOULD BE IGNORED
BY THIS COURT
1

POINT II:

RESPONDENT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE ON APPEAL, REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT ALL MORTGAGE PAYMENTS WERE MADE
FROM PETITIONER'S SEPARATE FUNDS
1

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID MISAPPLY THE LAW IN ITS
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTY WAS PETITIONER'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND
THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF
THE APPRECIATION OF SAID PROPERTY
3
POINT IV: EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT EXIST THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY AN UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE
MARITAL PROPERTY
7
POINT V:

THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT REIMBURSEMENT FOR
MEDICAL EXPENSES SHOULD BE REMANDED TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE PAYMENT WAS MADE
BEFORE ORDURING THE MARRIAGE
8

CONCLUSION

9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App. 373, 993 P.2d 887
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

4, 7
3, 4, 6

Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

3, 7

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977)

3, 7

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)

4

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

3, 6

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)

4, 5

Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Newmever v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987)
Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)

ii

3, 7, 8, 9
6, 7
3,4, 7

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER REGARDING
RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANCE ABUSE SHOULD BE IGNORED BY
THIS COURT.
Petitioner spends a significant amount of time in Petitioner's opposition brief

discussing Respondent's substance abuse. Respondent's substance abuse is irrelevant to
the issues present on appeal. One such statement even lacks citation to the record.
Specifically, Petitioner's statement that "Respondent came to court high on drugs and
reeking of alcohol" lacks any citation to the record. Petitioner's Brief at pg. 43. Clearly
the marriage was damaged. Clearly it is appropriate that the parties are now divorced.
However, Respondent's substance abuse does not have any bearing on the issues
presented here on appeal. Respondent is arguing that the trial court failed to properly
categorize the real property at issue as marital, and as a result, failed to divide it correctly.
Petitioner does not appear to provide any legal basis regarding the relevance of these
statements, other than how they may have impacted Respondent's credibility at the trial.
As such, this Court should ignore the statements made in Petitioner's brief regarding
Respondent's substance abuse to the extent that they fail to directly address the issues
present on appeal.
II.
RESPONDENT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE ON
APPEAL REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT ALL
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS WERE MADE FROM PETITIONER'S SEPARATE
FUNDS.
Petitioner argues that Respondent has failed to adequately marshal the evidence on
appeal regarding the trial court's finding that all payments of the mortgage principal and
1

interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds. See Petitioner's Brief at 13 and
R. at 705 and 727. Petitioner gives several examples of evidence that should have
purportedly been marshaled. However, the evidence Petitioner points to is irrelevant.
Rather than examine each piece of evidence discussed by Petitioner, the
undisputed evidence should be considered. It is not disputed that Petitioner made the
mortgage payments from her individual account. Tr. at 153: 11-25 and 154: 1-10. Nor is
it disputed that this is the same account that Respondent's personal injury settlement
funds were ultimately deposited. Tr. at 153: 23-25 and 154: 1-7, Exhibit 16 and
Petitioner's Brief at 25. The allegedly omitted, relevant evidence that Petitioner points to
does nothing to controvert the undisputed fact that Respondent's personal injury
settlement was deposited in the same account from which monthly mortgage payments
were made. For example, when Petitioner closed on the home, and when the parties
became separated is irrelevant, and does nothing to further the discussion of whether or
not the mortgage principal and interest was paid from Petitioner's separate funds. See
Petitioner's Brief at 13.
Therefore, this Court should find that Respondent has adequately marshaled the
evidence.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID MISAPPLY THE LAW IN ITS FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY WAS
PETITIONER'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THAT RESPONDENT WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE APPRECIATION OF SAID
PROPERTY.
Petitioner argues that the trial court correctly applied the law in making its
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the real property acquired during the marriage
was Petitioner's separate property. Petitioner's argument is simply not supported by the
undisputed evidence, and is contrary to law. A trial court's property division will be
modified when "there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings,
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(titing English v. English,
565 P.2d 409,410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App.
1987)). Clearly that has occurred in this situation.
The law regarding property division states, "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled
to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas
v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); See also Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d
1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("once a court makes a finding that a specific item is
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties").
Further, "[m]arital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318
3

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)). A
trial court should award separate property back to that spouse, including "appreciation or
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in i t . . . or (2) the property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made
a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,
308 (Utah 1988); See also Dunn 802 P.2d at 1321 ("[pjremarital property may lose its
separate distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital
estate, or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital
estate.") Any deviation from the rule that the marital estate be divided equally "is only
justified when the trial court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed findings' the
exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT
App. 373, f 27, 993 P.2d 887 (citing Thomas, 987 P.2d at 609).
Petitioner states that Respondent cannot show that his personal injury funds were
applied to the mortgage payments and principle. See Petitioner's Brief at 18. Even if
Petitioner is correct, and the mortgage payments were not at all made from the
contribution of Respondent's personal injury settlement, it is nonconsequential.
Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent's separate funds were deposited into
Petitioner's separate account. See Petitioner's Brief at 25 ("[t]he single deposit of Mr.
Johnson's personal injury settlement funds into the separate account of Ms. Castillo on
4

September 11, 2004 is not disputed.") Nor is it disputed that mortgage payments came
from that account. Tr. at 153: 11-25 and 154: 1-10. It is not disputed that after
Respondent's personal injury funds were deposited into Petitioner's personal account, the
landscaping was paid for from that account. Tr. at 167: 14-25; 168: 1-9 and Exhibit 15.
At the close of proceedings, the trial court stated in regard to the $24,635.37 that
constituted a portion of Respondent's personal injury settlement, "[i]t appears that the
$24,000 or whatever that was put into her account was used in part for landscaping." Tr.
at 209:8-9; See also, Petitioner's Brief at pg. 20, ("[a]n analysis of the separate bank
account activity, Addenda 3 and 4, during September and October, 2004, in the light most
favorable to the findings, shows that Mr. Johnson's personal injury settlement proceeds
were applied towards payment of the amounts associated with the landscaping bid
proposal") Landscaping is an important aspect of real property and contributed to the
value of the real property at issue in this matter. Therefore, how Respondent's personal
injury funds were spent is irrelevant. The decisive factor is whether or not those funds
contributed to the value of the real property. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 ("the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance,
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it.") Where the
trial court made statements that at the very least Respondent's financial contributions
should be attributed to landscaping, there has been "enhancement." Id.
It is also unimportant that Respondent's financial contributions were smaller than
Petitioner's. As was stated in Respondent's initial brief, factors in property division "do
5

not include a consideration of which partner was the more economically productive
during the marriage." Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1322. Any such analysis would be flawed
because it "ignores contributions of love, encouragement, and companionship, which
elude monetary valuation . . . [and] gives short shrift to spouses who contribute
homemaking skills and child care." Id Initially, it should be noted that this was real
property purchased after the marriage, and was the place where the parties raised their
minor child. R. at 48 121(a) and 56 ^ 1; R. at 2 and 35 & Tr. at 14-20. Further,
Newmever v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987), which was not dealt with directly
by Petitioner, should be considered. In that case there was a marked disparity in the
financial contributions of the parties. Id. at 1277-1278. The trial court determined that
the plaintiff was entitled to the amounts she had contributed towards the homes, but that
the equity was marital property and should be divided equally. IcL at 1277. The Utah
Supreme Court determined that the trial court had acted appropriately when it awarded
Jeddy Newmeyer "an equal share in the appreciation of the value of the homes despite his
much lower contribution," despite the differentiation in financial contribution. Id. at
1278. Respondent should not be penalized because of his smaller financial contribution.
However, the amount Respondent contributed, roughly $24,000.00, is significant under
any standard.
In this case, the real property should have then been categorized as marital. See
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022. At that point, the appreciation to the real property should have
been divided equally, after encumbrances for the property were paid, expenses for the
6

sale were paid, and each party was given back what financial contributions had been
made. See Newmever, 745 P.2d at 1278; Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. Clearly there has
been a "misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error," with "the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings," and a
"serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo, 751
P.2d at 1146 (citing English, 565 P.2d at 410; Eames, 735 P.2d at 397.) The trial court's
determination should be reversed.
IV. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT EXIST THAT WOULD
JUSTIFY AN UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY.
In Utah, "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property." Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. Further,
an unequal distribution of marital property by a trial court "is only justified when the trial
court 'memorialize^] in commendably detailed findings' the exceptional circumstances
supporting the distribution." Bradford, 1999 UT App. at f27; (citing Thomas, 987 P.2d
at 609.) This Court should ignore Petitioner's arguments regarding special
circumstances.
Petitioner argues that Respondent failed to show any special circumstances at trial
that would justify giving him any of Petitioner's separate property. Respondent's Brief at
23. Petitioner misses the point of Respondent's argument. Respondent argues that the
real property's appreciation is marital property and therefore should be divided equally.
Thomas, 987 P.2d at 610. Then, if the marital property is not divided equally the trial
court must find special circumstances to warrant the unequal distribution. Bradford, 1999
7

UT App. at Tf 27. Respondent need not show exceptional circumstances, as Petitioner
argues, because he did not ask for more than half of the marital property.
Petitioner argued that her special circumstances are a need for future surgeries.
Petitioner's Brief at 44. However, Petitioner failed to present evidence regarding the cost
of future surgeries and whether Petitioner's trust, which was designed to cover such
surgeries, would be insufficient without an unequal distribution of the appreciation of the
marital home. Nor did the trial court make adequate findings in this regard.
Therefore, this Court should hold that the trial court failed to properly categorize
the property and failed to memorialize in detail findings Petitioner's special
circumstances to warrant an unequal distribution of the marital property.
V.
THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT REIMBURSEMENT FOR
MEDICAL EXPENSES SHOULD BE REMANDED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE PAYMENT WAS MADE BEFORE OR DURING THE
MARRIAGE.
The trial court reimbursed Petitioner $10,000.00 for a surgery that she paid for
regarding Respondent's back. R. at 705 and 727-728. Respondent argues that the trial
court did not have sufficient facts to determine that the payment was subject to
reimbursement because the date of the surgery was not determined, therefore requiring a
remand. Respondent's Brief at 36-38, Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1148. Petitioner responds to
this argument by stating that the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility
of the witness and their testimony. Petitioner's Brief at 46. Credibility of the witness has
nothing to do with the determination at issue here. Clearly from the transcript, neither
party could recall the date which is essential for that determination. Tr. 153: 1-6.
8

The Utah Court of Appeals has stated "[b]ecause of the personal nature of special
damages, amounts received as compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability,
or other personal debilitation are generally found to be the personal property of the
injured spouse in divorce actions." Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1148. Further, "money realized
as compensation for lost wages and medical expenses, which diminish the marital estate,
are considered to be marital property." Id. Petitioner argues that the burden switches to
the Respondent to persuade the trial court regarding the disposition of his personal injury.
Petitioner's Brief at 46. However, Petitioner fails to cite to any authority for this legal
conclusion. Moreover, it was Petitioner who was asking the trial court to award her
money from Respondent's potentially separate funds.
Therefore, this Court should hold that the issue of reimbursement for medical
expenses should be remanded to determine whether the payment was made before or
during the marriage.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court be
reversed, or in the alternative that the case be remanded so that adequate findings can be
made in regard to the cost of future surgeries for Petitioner, whether Petitioner can pay
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for those surgeries from her personal injury settlement, and/or the exact date of
Respondent's surgery and when that surgery was paid for.
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